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This article provides a new account of employers' advantages over employees in
federal employment discrimination cases. We analyze the effects of judicial deference,
in which judges use institutionalized employment structures to infer nondiscrimination
without scrutinizing those structures in any meaningful way. Using logistic regression to
analyze a representative sample of judicial opinions in federal EEO cases during the first
thirty-five years after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, we find that when judges
uncritically use the presence of organizational structures to reason about whether
discrimination occurred, employers are much more likely to prevail. This pattern is
especially pronounced in opinions written by liberal judges. In light of these findings, we
offer recommendations for judges, lawyers, and policy makers-including legal
academics-who seek to improve the accuracy and efficacy of employment
discrimination adjudications.
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INTRODUCTION
That the "haves" come out ahead in civil disputing (Galanter 1974) is now a
commonplace argument with substantial empirical support. The sociolegal literature
inspired by Galanter's work specifies numerous mechanisms that, over time, system-
atically advantage better-resourced and better-organized repeat players at the
expense of less well-resourced one-shotters (Stigler 1971; Blumrosen 1993; Songer
and Sheehan 1993; Albiston 1999; Edelman and Suchman 1999; Thomburg 1999;
Leech et al. 2002, Kamieniecki 2006; Krieger 2007; Quintanilla 2011; Gertner
2012).
In this article, we highlight a new source of inequality in civil litigation by
bringing together hypotheses drawn from two literatures that have until now pro-
ceeded largely independently: the neoinstitutional literature on law and organiza-
tions and research on judicial ideology. In addition, we draw on studies of judicial
cognition to help explain our findings and, more generally, to explain the connec-
tion between institutionalized structures in organizations, judicial ideology, and out-
comes in civil rights cases. Using a representative sample of federal civil rights
cases decided during the first thirty-five years after the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, we explore the interplay between judicial ideology, judicial deference
to organizational structures, and case outcome. We find that when judges use the
presence of organizational structures (i.e., policies, practices, offices, and officers) to
reason about whether discrimination occurred without scrutinizing the adequacy of
those structures, employers are much more likely to prevail. The fact that judges
use institutionalized employment structures heuristically to infer nondiscrimination
helps explain employers' increasing advantage in EEO litigation.
We also show that judicial ideology and judicial deference interact in a surpris-
ing way: the effect of judges' uncritical deference to organizational structures is
especially pronounced in opinions written by liberal judges, even though, all else
equal, liberal judges tend to be more pro-plaintiff. Plaintiff win rates decline more
when liberal judges defer to institutionalized organizational structures than when
conservative judges defer to these structures. These findings have important impli-
cations for both judges and lawyers, and they suggest the need to consider institu-
tionalized organizational structures in explaining judicial decision making with
respect to laws regulating organizations.
INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL REASONING
In this section, we very briefly review three literatures that inform our project
and findings. The judicial ideology literature, found primarily in political science,
suggests the importance of judges' political orientations in predicting case outcomes.
The neoinstitutional literature on law and organizations, found primarily in sociol-
ogy, informs our attention to institutionalized organizational structures. Our analysis
focuses on variables derived from these two literatures. However, we also briefly
review the judicial cognition literature, found primarily in law and behavioral
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economics, because this research provides a possible explanation for how institu-
tionalized organizational structures affect judicial decision making.
Judicial Ideology
Sociolegal scholars have long been skeptical of the legal formalist idea that
judges are impartial or unswayed by political, economic, and social interests. A
voluminous literature in political science reveals that politics, attitudes, strategic
considerations, and historical and cultural influences affect judicial reasoning and
judicial decisions. Focusing primarily, but not exclusively, on the Supreme Court,
political scientists have asked why judges decide cases as they do and what influen-
ces their decisions beyond the reasons given in their written opinions.
The attitudinal approach emphasizes judges' ideological values as an important
influence beyond the facts of the case (Pritchett 1948; Segal and Cover 1989;
Baum 1992; Segal and Spaeth 1993, 1996, 2002; Spaeth and Segal 1999). For
example, in a comprehensive analysis of the federal judiciary covering twenty-four
areas of law, Sunstein et al. (2006) find that federal judges appointed by Demo-
cratic presidents vote in ways that can be characterized as liberal 52 percent of the
time overall, whereas federal judges appointed by Republican presidents vote liberal
40 percent of the time. They argue that partisan voting emerges in the context of
legal ambiguity: in cases where there is no clear legal answer, attitudes and political
ideology come into play. Importantly, the impact of judicial ideology is strongest at
the Supreme Court level, somewhat less strong at the appellate level, and weakest
at the district court level, possibly because lower court judges are more concerned
with avoiding reversals by higher court judges (Pinello 1999). The composition of
judicial panels matters as well: individual judges' politics are moderated on a mixed
panel and exacerbated on a panel of judges with similar ideological views (Revesz
1997; Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman 2004; Sunstein et al. 2006). Judges, according
to the attitudinal approach, are essentially politicians in robes (Epstein and Knight
2013).
Strategic choice scholars qualify the attitudinal model by suggesting that, espe-
cially on the Supreme Court, judges and justices do not act only according to their
ideological preferences, but also take into account the preferences and actions of
other relevant actors, such as their colleagues, elected officials, and the public
(Eskridge 1991a, 1991b; Knight and Epstein 1996; Cross and Tiller 1998; Epstein
and Knight 1998, 2000; Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzmann 1998; Epstein and Mar-
tin 2010). Historical institutionalists argue that contexts, traditions, norms, and
cognitive structures help constitute judges' preferences and behaviors (Clayton and
Gillman 1999; Maveety 2003; McGuire 2004). Feeley and Rubin (1999) take even
a stronger stand, suggesting that at least in the arena of prison reform, judges
engage in purposive policy making. As economists, law professors, and psychologists
join political scientists in the study of judicial behavior, the list of motivations that
scholars find to influence judicial behavior is ever-growing (Posner 1993; Guthrie,
Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2007; Rachlinski et al. 2009; Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz,
and Schrag 2009; Shepherd 2009; Epstein and Knight 2013).
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Although these modifications to the attitudinal approach are important, virtu-
ally all scholars of judicial behavior agree that judicial ideology is an important pre-
dictor of case outcome, especially in higher courts. Gibson (1983, 9) aptly
summarized the political science literature on judicial behavior when he wrote that
"judges' decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they
think they ought to do, but constrained by what they perceive it feasible to do."
Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Organizational Structures
Judicial deference to institutionalized organizational structures has not received
much attention in the political science literature. However, a robust neoinstitu-
tional literature on law and organizations suggests that organizations respond to
ambiguous law, and to the legal environment generally, by creating a variety of
symbolic legal structures designed to signal attention to law and thus confer legiti-
macy (Edelman 1990, 1992; Sutton et al. 1994; cf. Kelly 2003). In the context of
civil rights law, which tends to be highly ambiguous, organizations create specific
compliance structures like EEO offices and discrimination grievance procedures.
They also formalize their personnel practices by creating structures like progressive
discipline policies and formal multiperson decision-making bodies. Over the first
few decades after the enactment of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, these
structures became widely accepted, or institutionalized, as evidenced by their diffu-
sion across organizations (Edelman 1990, 1992; Dobbin et al. 1993; Sutton and
Dobbin 1996; Edelman and Petterson 1999; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1,999;
Marshall 2005; Dobbin 2009).
Importantly, empirical work has established that these organizational struc-
tures, although they appear to further legal ideals, are often ineffective (Baron,
Mittman, and Newman 1991; Edelman and Petterson 1999; Edelman, Fuller, and
Mara-Drita 2001; Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006). Studies of complex organizations
consistently show that their informal cultures and concrete actions often vary sig-
nificantly from their formal policies (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939; Selznick
1949, 1957; Burawoy 1979; Edwards 1979; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Scott
and Davis 2007). Thus, organizations adopt antidiscrimination policies, but often
decouple their formal policies from their informal practice (Weick 1976; Edelman
1992). They create special EEO compliance offices and affirmative action managers,
but give those offices and managers no real authority to change discriminatory
organizational behavior (Stone 1975; Edelman 1990; Chambliss 1996; Edelman and
Suchman 1999). They institute performance evaluation procedures and progressive
discipline policies, but fail to discern when managers use these policies to cover up
discrimination rather than to prevent it (Bisom-Rapp 1999). Managerial rhetoric
reframes affirmative action and antidiscrimination policies as diversity management,
which weakens the original policy aims of antidiscrimination law by broadening the
categories along which diversity is sought (e.g., diversity of dress style as well as
racial diversity) and by reframing sociopolitical problems (e.g., racism, sexism) as
interpersonal ones (e.g., personality conflicts or communication failures) (Edelman,
Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001). Overall, while structures that involve tangible goals
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for which the organization will be held accountable (such as OFCCP compliance
agreements containing goals and timetables for the hiring or promotion of females
and minorities) are effective in increasing the ranks of female and minority manag-
ers, many of the most common structures, such as diversity evaluations, diversity
training, and minority networking programs, do little to improve the status of
women and minorities and may even harm minority groups (Kalev, Dobbin, and
Kelly 2006).
Legal endogeneity theory (Edelman 2005, 2007) suggests that ideas about com-
pliance that originate in organizational fields eventually influence thinking in the
legal sphere as well. As compliance with civil rights law is increasingly associated
with the creation of internal legal structures like antidiscrimination policies, lawyers
and judges begin to infer compliance and rationality from the mere presence of
institutionalized organizational structures. These views are reinforced by employ-
ment lawyers, who engage in what might be called preventive lawyering by reassur-
ing clients that compliance structures can protect organizations from EEO liability
(Bisom-Rapp 1999). Employer-side lawyers subsequently advance these arguments
to judges (Grossman 2003). Even employees who seek to mobilize EEO rights, or
the plaintiff-side lawyers they consult, may believe that the presence of formal,
institutionalized structures either equates to compliance with EEO laws or will
make suspect employment decisions too expensive or difficult to challenge legally
(Bisom-Rapp 1999).
Legal endogeneity theory holds that just as employees and employers are influ-
enced by managerialized conceptions of law, judges tend to take their cues from
norms and practices that become institutionalized in organizations (Edelman 2005,
2007; Edelman et al. 2011). Most federal judges have served in leadership roles
within public or private organizations and have represented large organizational cli-
ents (Purcell 1992; Yoon 2003; Schneider 2005). By the time they take the bench,
judges' legal consciousness has likely been significantly influenced by managerial
and business logics. Thus, even though none of the EEO statutes explicitly requires
that organizations adopt any particular organizational structures to comply with the
law, judges began to think of structures as proof of compliance and good faith, even
in the absence of evidence of the structures' effectiveness at preventing
discrimination.
Edelman et al. (2011) provide empirical support for legal endogeneity theory
and specifically for the idea that judges defer to the mere presence of institutional-
ized organizational structures when they reason about the presence or absence of
discrimination. Using a representative sample of federal employment discrimination
opinions issued during the first thirty-five years after passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the authors examined patterns over time of three indicia of legal endo-
geneity: first, whether judges mentioned organizational structures in their opinions;
second, whether judges indicated that the presence of organizational structures was
relevant to whether discrimination had occurred; and third, whether judges deferred
to organizational structures, that is, used structures to infer nondiscrimination with-
out explicitly scrutinizing those structures' effectiveness or adequacy.
Edelman et al. (2011) found increasing relevance of and deference to organiza-
tional structures over time, as those structures became increasingly institutionalized.
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They found that judges were especially likely to look for signs of organizational ration-
ality where the applicable legal doctrine requires them to evaluate aspects of employer
behaviors that are not directly observable-for example, in disparate treatment cases,
which require judges to infer employer intent from circumstantial evidence (Edelman
et al. 2011). The inherent difficulty of ascertaining intent, coupled with the legal pre-
sumption that discrimination is aberrant (Krieger 1995, 1998; Krieger and Fiske 2006)
may lead courts to look for signs or symptoms of apparent employer legitimacy or
rationality. In fact, Edelman et al. (2011) found that judges were even more likely to
defer to structures in disparate treatment cases than in hostile work environment
cases, in which organizational structures, such as grievance procedures and antiharass-
ment policies, were made relevant by Supreme Court decisions like Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton (1998) and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth (1998).
Edelman et al.'s (2011) findings suggest that organizational structures play an
important role in judicial decision making. However, they did not explore the rela-
tionship between judicial deference and case outcome or the interactions between
judicial deference and judicial politics.
Cognitive Constraints on Judicial Decision Making
Recent empirical work in cognitive social psychology supplies a third lens
through which judicial decision making in employment discrimination litigation
can be examined. Specifically, studies of judicial cognition provide insights into
how the presence of symbolic institutionalized structures might influence judges'
decision making-either alone at the district court level, or with other judges in
circuit court decisions produced by three-judge or en banc panels.
Research on judicial cognition suggests that judges-like everyone else-apply
two different systems of reasoning: one that is intuitive, heuristic based, and fast
and a second that is deliberative, rule based, and slow (Kahneman and Frederick
2002; Frederick 2005; Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2007; Rachlinski 2011).
The first of these, sometimes referred to as System 1 (Kahneman and Frederick
2002), allows judges to make rapid decisions in complex cases, but it is significantly
susceptible to judgment error. These errors can be corrected through more delibera-
tive System 2 processes (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Guthrie, Rachlinski, and
Wistrich 2007; Rachlinski 2011). However, System 2 processing requires time,
effort, and motivation. It is less likely to occur in time-pressured situations or in sit-
uations where nothing in the decision-making environment induces deliberation
(Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2007; Brest and Krieger 2010).
Judges, like laypeople, operate under conditions of cognitive constraint. Conse-
quently, they sometimes form intuitive judgments about the cases they must decide
through the application of fast, intuitive System 1 processes. This subjects their
judgment to the effects of numerous biases and heuristics (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and
Wistrich 2001, 2002, 2007; Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski 2005; Rachlinski
2011; Fraidin 2013; Rachlinski, Wistrich, and Guthrie 2013; Powers 2014).
For example, judges, like other people, are subject to anchoring and framing
effects (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001; Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski
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2005) and to hindsight bias (Kamin and Rachlinski 1995; Rachlinski 1998; Gulati,
Rachlinski, and Langevoort 2004). In judging the likelihood that a particular event
occurred, judges, like laypeople, tend to overrely on intuitive hunches at the
expense of statistical information, neglecting base rate probabilities and relying
instead on a mental shortcut known as the representativeness heuristic (Guthrie,
Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001).
Recent research on judicial cognition has also shown that judges are subject to
the effects of primes, legally nonrelevant facts to which they are exposed during the
decision-making process, which focus their attention in a particular direction
(Rachlinski, Wistrich, and Guthrie 2013). Left unadjusted by deliberative System 2
processing, primes can unwittingly alter judges' reasoning in ways not responsive to
applicable legal rules and principles.
These cognitive constraints on judicial inference help to explain at a micro
level the impact of institutionalized employment practices that neoinstitutional
scholars observe at a macro level. Specifically, judicial deference to institutionalized
employment practices may reflect, at least in part, the operation of uncorrected Sys-
tem 1 processes, through which the presence of institutionalized employment prac-
tices primes ideas about employer rationality and fairness, which, in turn, influence
judicial inferences about the likelihood that a challenged decision resulted from dis-
criminatory motivation.
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND CASE OUTCOME
In the current study, we extend previous work on judicial decision making and
legal endogeneity theory by examining the effect of judicial deference to institu-
tionalized organizational structures on case outcome. Given the importance of judi-
cial ideology in the political science literature, we are particularly interested in the
effect of judicial deference, net of the effect of judicial ideology, and in any interac-
tion between judicial deference and judicial ideology.
In examining the effect of judicial deference on case outcome, we expand on
previous research. Edelman et al. (2011) treated deference as the dependent vari-
able and sought to explain when and why judges defer to organizational structures.
In contrast to Edelman et al. (2011), we treat judicial deference as the key inde-
pendent variable and seek to explain the impact of judicial deference on case out-
come.1 Importantly, employers may either win or lose a case in which deference to
a structure has occurred, both because multiple structures could be considered in a
case (some deferred to and others not deferred to) and because factors other than
deference can affect case outcome as well. Thus, this study tests the final step in
legal endogeneity theory-the effect of judicial deference on case outcome. Further,
by examining the independent effects of and interaction between judicial deference
and judicial ideology, this study links legal endogeneity theory to extant work on
1. Since a case may discuss multiple organizational structures, Edelman et al. (2011) used structures as
the unit of analysis. Since parties win cases, not structures, our unit of analysis is the case and we measure
the effect of the number of structures that the judge deferred to on the employee's chance of winning at least
a partial victory.
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judicial decision making. We now turn to the empirical question of whether and, if
so, how judicial deference affects case outcome.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
We analyze a random sample of 1,024 federal civil rights opinions written by
the federal district and circuit courts from 1965 through 1999. US Supreme Court
cases were excluded because of their relatively small numbers and because they
affected the outcomes of subsequent cases. The sample includes opinions from cases
arising under the following federal civil rights statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, and two post-civil war civil rights statutes: 42 USCA Section 1981
and 42 USCA Section 1983. These civil rights statutes all prohibit discrimination
against particular classes of employees.
2
The sample was selected by searching Westlaw for all reported and unreported
decisions under these statutes3 (34,578 district court opinions and 16,604 circuit
court opinions).4 Within the district and circuit court samples, we ordered the
opinions chronologically and selected every fiftieth case.
5
All opinions were read and coded by second- and third-year law students who
had taken a course in EEO law and received at least 100 hours of coding training.
Extensive efforts were undertaken to ensure intercoder reliability, described in detail
in Edelman et al. (2011). A large portion of the coding revolved around the treat-
ment of forty-five types of organizational structures, including formal rules, policies,
functionaries, and practices. These structures, and the ways in which they can be
deferred to, divide into three categories. The first category comprises compliance
structures, such as antidiscrimination policies, which explicitly signal attention to
2. The sample excludes cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because the accommodation requirement contained in those statutes made it
difficult to assess deference in a standardized manner across opinions. Opinions in cases brought under the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 were also excluded due to complicated issues involving notice.
3. Most EEO charges filed never result in a judicial opinion, primarily because many are resolved
before reaching this stage (Siegelman and Donohue 1990). Therefore, our data are not representative of all
EEO charges. However, since our study focuses on judicial reasoning, the key question is whether our sample
is representative of judicial opinions. Since the Westlaw database attempts to include every federal decision,
including those that are not legally published, we believe our data are representative of federal judicial
opinions.
4. Observing endogeneity through published opinions necessarily misses the impact of endogeneity
on cases that do not reach litigation. For example, plaintiffs' lawyers may discourage employees who have
not used internal grievance procedures from filing suit for sexual harassment, believing that the employee's
failure to use the procedure weakens her case. To the extent that a sample based on Westlaw is unrepresen-
tative, we believe that it will produce conservative estimates of the impact of deference on employees' rights
generally.
5. The initially selected cases were reviewed to ensure that they represented merits adjudications of
EEO claims arising under any of the above-mentioned statutes. If a selected case did not satisfy this crite-
rion, it was excluded from the sample, and the next case in chronological order was reviewed in the same
manner until a qualifying case was identified.
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law. When judges defer to these policies, they are accepting the symbolism of these
structures without scrutiny as to whether they are effective. The second category
comprises personnel policies, such as employee handbooks, multiperson decision-
making processes, and progressive discipline systems, which involve rules about gov-
ernance. When judges defer to these policies, they fail to scrutinize whether or how
the structures are implemented within organizations. The third type is business prac-
tices, such as reduction in force (RIF) plans, appearance requirements, or the post-
ing of openings. Deference to formalized business practices, which is far less
common, usually occurs where a judge writes that an organization is justified in fol-
lowing its own policies, irrespective of how they are carried out and whether they
apply generally to all employees. See Appendix 2 for a full list of structures.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is who wins at this stage of the case. We classify opin-





Our key independent variable is judicial deference. Following Edelman et al.
(2011), we define judicial deference to organizational structures as occurring when
judges use structures as indicators of nondiscrimination without scrutinizing their
adequacy or while ignoring strong evidence that the structures are inadequate. Def-
erence occurs (1) when judges fail to consider the adequacy of organizational struc-
tures, (2) when judges offer mere lip service to the adequacy of organizational
structures, or (3) when judges use structures to infer nondiscrimination even while
explicitly acknowledging their inadequacy. We provide examples of each type of
deference below.
In the first form of judicial deference, judges do not consider adequacy at all-
that is, they use the presence of the structure as evidence of nondiscrimination
without ever asking if the structure was designed or operated to prevent bias from
affecting decisions, was consistent and even-handedly applied, or was applied
6. Our coding scheme distinguished between employer victories (n = 590), mixed outcomes in which
the employer won on the principle (n = 5), mixed outcomes in which each party won something on princi-
ple (n = 91), multiple claims in which each party won at least one claim (n = 55), mixed outcomes in which
the employee won on principle (n = 48), and plaintiff victories (n = 232). For ease of interpretation of the
results, we present logistic regressions of a two-category dependent variable in the main text, asking whether
deference makes it more likely that employers will secure a complete victory, keeping plaintiffs from win-
ning anything at all. Our employer victory category includes complete employee victories and the small num-
ber of cases coded as mixed outcomes in which the employer won on principle. Reclassifying these five cases
as partial plaintiff victories does not substantively affect the results. We classify all other cases as at least par-
tial plaintiff victories. Generalized ordered logistic regressions of a three-category dependent variable
(employer victory, mixed outcome, and employee victory) yielded similar results (see Appendix 1).
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properly in a given case. For example, in Grubb v. W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital,
Inc. (1984), the Sixth Circuit failed to consider the adequacy of two structures: a
grievance procedure and an RIF. In overturning the district court's finding of race
discrimination, the circuit court pointed to the fact that the plaintiff had not used
the company's formal grievance procedure to complain about his termination
(despite the fact that the personnel director told him that it would be "useless" for
him to do so). The court used the mere presence of the grievance procedure as evi-
dence of nondiscrimination without investigating its adequacy. Additionally, the
district court had concluded that the RIF had been a pretext for race discrimina-
tion. In reversing the district court's decision, the circuit court failed to question
whether or not there had been a real RIF, despite the fact that the plaintiff was the
only employee terminated.
In the second form of judicial deference, judges pay lip service to adequacy: they
state that a structure is adequate but also recite facts that self-evidently show that
the structure is inadequate. So, for example, the court may note that similarly situ-
ated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class were treated more favorably or
less harshly under the structure or note that a formal policy was applied by mistake,
but nonetheless state that the structure was adequate. Or, the judge might allow
that the plaintiff had shown evidence of procedural irregularities in the application
of the structure, but also state that the structure was adequate. In these types of
cases, one might describe the court as merely giving lip service to the adequacy of a
structure that, by the court's own description, had evident and serious flaws that
rendered it irrational, unfair, and not indicative of legal compliance.
7
For example, in Lacy v. Ameritech (1988), the employer had used a formal
evaluation procedure to select employees for an RIF. The plaintiff raised examples
of similarly situated whites being treated more favorably under the supposedly neu-
tral rating system used to select employees for the RIF, but the court summarily dis-
missed these examples as irrelevant. The court also dismissed as irrelevant the fact
that the employer had gone back and changed the system for rating employees and
that it had significantly underranked the plaintiff on one of the relevant criteria. In
this case, while the court stated that the structure was adequate, the text of the
opinion suggested that the court was not actually considering the evidence for and
against adequacy.
In the third form of judicial deference, plaintiffs attack the adequacy of a struc-
ture and the court acknowledges that the structure is deficient, but nonetheless uses
the structure to support a finding of nondiscrimination. The Southern District of
New York's decision granting the employer's motion for summary judgment in Leo-
pold v. Baccarat (2000) provides a stark example of this practice.
In Leopold, the plaintiff employee claimed hostile work environment harass-
ment by her supervisor. In defense, the employer pointed to its policy against har-
assment and an accompanying harassment complaint procedure. The plaintiff
7. To classify an opinion as involving lip service, we required two coders independently to determine
that there was strong evidence in the opinion establishing that the structure was inadequate. Even so, this
category is more subjective than the other two forms of judicial deference. Therefore, we ran all models with
and without these cases of lip service coded as deference. Our results are very similar when we exclude lip
service from the definition of deference (see Appendix 1).
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explicitly argued that merely having an antiharassment policy and a complaint pro-
cedure should not protect an employer from liability where, as in her case, the
employer's policy or the procedure was flawed in ways that made it ineffective.
First, the plaintiff pointed out, and the court acknowledged, that the employer's
policy required her first to report the harassment to her immediate supervisor-in
this case, the alleged harasser himself. Second, the plaintiff demonstrated that the
policy lacked a guarantee that employees reporting harassment would not face retal-
iation for doing so.
These two features of the employer's policies and procedures, the plaintiff testi-
fied, made her and several of her coworkers too afraid to file a harassment com-
plaint with the company before filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In
support of her argument that the employer's complaint procedure was materially
defective, she pointed out that by failing to provide a harasser bypassing mechanism
and an antiretaliation guarantee, the employer's policy and procedure violated
EEOC interpretive guidelines on effective antiharassment policies and harassment
complaint procedures. Nonetheless, the court used the mere existence of the
employer's policy complaint procedure to find for the defendant. Dismissing the
EEOC guidance as nonbinding, and the plaintiff's testimony about her and her
coworkers' fears of retaliation as "conclusory allegations," the court ruled for the
defendant employer, observing that "the law is very clear that any reasonable policy
will do." In other words, the court recognized that the structure was inadequate, but
nonetheless used it as evidence of nondiscrimination.
Not all judicial treatment of organizational structures constitutes deference.
Where judges do scrutinize the adequacy of organizational structures, usually by
reviewing whether the structure is fairly and even-handedly applied, calculated and
operated to reduce bias, and free of defects that would undermine its efficacy, defer-
ence does not occur.
For example, in Schartz v. Unified School District No. 512 (1997), a teacher
claimed that he was forced to retire as a result of age discrimination. In its defense,
the school district invoked an organizational structure: a progressive discipline pol-
icy. The defense explained that after numerous students complained about the
plaintiffs obscene and abusive speech, the plaintiff received oral and written warn-
ings, then a last-chance notice, and then termination. In considering the applica-
tion of the progressive discipline structure, the court considered the plaintiffs
allegations of defects in the way the progressive discipline policy was applied. In its
opinion granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs age discrimination claim, the
court carefully examined the process and found that it was followed adequately. In
this example, the court properly interrogated the adequacy of the structure, rather
than assuming that the presence of a policy supported an inference of nondiscrimi-
nation. Thus, deference did not occur.
In another example, in McDowell v. Mississippi Power & Light (1986), the
plaintiff alleged that she had been denied a promotion as a result of sex discrimina-
tion. She was married to another employee and her employer defended on the basis
of its antinepotism policy. Rather than assuming that this structure was evidence of
nondiscrimination, the court closely examined the terms and the application of the
policy. The court noted that the policy had not been applied in many cases
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involving male applicants whose wives worked for the company, that the policy
had never been mentioned to the plaintiff until after she filed her complaint, and
that the plaintiffs promotion would not actually have violated the precise terms of
the policy. Having concluded that the structure was inadequate to prevent gender
bias from influencing decision making, the court rendered judgment for the plain-
tiff. Again, deference did not occur.
In sum, judicial deference to organizational structures exists only where judges
treat the mere existence of an organizational structure as evidence of nondiscrimi-
nation, irrespective of the adequacy or quality of that structure. Judicial deference
to structures does not exist where judges offer even a minimal analysis of the ade-
quacy of structures and deem them either adequate or inadequate.
Thus, we distinguish between structures that were deferred to and those in
which judges scrutinized structures and deemed them either adequate or inadequate.
Our coding scheme does not measure the accuracy of judges' assessments of struc-
tures' adequacy. For our purposes, the key question is whether judges scrutinize a
structure's efficacy at all before using it as evidence of nondiscrimination. This
makes our definition of deference fairly narrow, excluding many instances in which
judges engage in minimal scrutiny of structures. Therefore, our results should be
understood as a lower bound on the frequency and effects of judicial deference.
Since judges may defer to multiple structures within a case, we measure judi-
cial deference as a count of the number of times the judge deferred to a structure.




We measure judges' political ideology using the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers
(2001) method.9 This measure takes into account the political orientations of the
president and senators who participated in the judge's appointment and it has been
shown to be a more accurate measure of judicial politics than the political party of
the appointing president alone (Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers 2001). Since higher
scores indicate greater conservatism, we call this measure judicial conservatism. To
explore whether the relationship between deference and case outcome differs across
the political spectrum, we also include an interaction effect between judicial con-
servatism and judicial deference.
8. Judicial opinions often refer to multiple structures and we sum the number of structures in each cat-
egory. As a robustness check, we ran separate analyses in which we replaced these sums with dichotomous
variables indicating whether the opinion included any structures in each category. All results remained stat-
istically significant and in the same direction.
9. The Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers method uses common space scores, based on senators' and presi-
dents' political orientations based on their voting records (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 1998). When
both senators share the president's party affiliation, the judge's score is the average of the senators' common
space scores. When only one senator shares the president's party affiliation, the judge is assigned the com-
mon space score of that senator. When neither senator shares the president's party affiliation, the judge is
assigned the president's common space score. Micheal Giles kindly provided data on circuit court judges'
political orientations, as well as his algorithm, which we used to calculate common space scores for district
court judges using data from the National Judicial Center. In cases with multiple judges, we use the average
score. This measure ranges from-1 (most liberal) to + 1 (most conservative).
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Control Variables
Our analyses include several sets of control variables. First, we control for vari-
ous plaintiff characteristics. We include variables indicating female plaintiffs, non-
white plaintiffs, and plaintiffs whose race or sex is not mentioned in the opinion
(white males are the omitted category). Because Best et al. (2011) found a signifi-
cant interaction between race and sex in predicting case outcome, we also include
a variable for nonwhite female plaintiffs. We control for plaintiffs' occupational
prestige using 1980 Census occupational categories and the 1989 General Social
Survey (GSS) occupational prestige scale (Nakao and Treas 1992). We include a
dummy variable indicating plaintiffs whose occupation was not mentioned in the
opinion; their prestige scores are set to the mean. We also include variables for the
plaintiffs' organizational backing: class action lawsuits, the involvement of govern-
mental or public interest organizations as plaintiffs or amici, and union
membership.
In addition, we control for several characteristics of the court, procedural pos-
ture, legal theories, and claims. We distinguish between district court cases, circuit
court cases in which the employer prevailed in the district court, and circuit court
cases in which the employee achieved at least a partial victory in the circuit court.
We also include variables indicating whether the opinion results from a motion to
dismiss or from an employer's motion for summary judgment; whether the case
involved disparate impact, disparate treatment, and/or hostile work environment
theory; and whether the plaintiffs made intersectional claims alleging discrimination
based on more than one aspect of their identities (Best et al. 2011). Finally, since
plaintiff win rates have declined over time, we control for year.10 Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
Method of Analysis
We use logistic regression to analyze the relationship between case outcome
and our independent variables. Our results were very robust to model specification;
our findings were substantively unchanged when using generalized ordered logistic
regressions of a three-category dependent variable and when including random
effects for judges (see Appendix 1).
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the results of a nested set of models exploring the determi-
nants of case outcome. Positive coefficients indicate increased likelihood that plain-
tiffs will achieve at least a partial victory; negative coefficients indicate increased
likelihood of complete defendant victory.
10. Our findings were very similar when using year fixed effects instead of a linear year variable (see
Appendix 1).




At least partial plaintiff victory 43%
Number of structures
Deferred to 0.40 0.84 [0, 71
Scrutinized, deemed adequate 0.22 0.64 [0, 5]
Scrutinized, deemed inadequate 0.20 0.63 [0, 5]










Occupational prestige 47 13 [17, 99]
Prestige missing 22%
Class action 8.9%
Government agency or public interest law 9.2%
firm as plaintiff or amicus
Union member 16%
Court, history, and procedural posture
District court 67%
Circuit court, employer won in lower court 26%
Circuit court, employee won in lower court 7.6%
Motion to dismiss 5.4%
Summary judgment (employer's motion) 51%
Legal theories and claims
Disparate impact 13%
Disparate treatment 85%
Hostile work environment 15%
Intersectional claim 17%
Year 1990 7.5 [1967, 1999]
Model 1 (Table 2) is the baseline model, including only the control variables.
Not surprisingly, given that appellate judges are deferential to lower courts, plain-
tiffs were more likely to win circuit court cases if they had won in the lower courts
and less likely to win circuit court cases if they had lost in the lower courts. Con-
sistent with prior research (Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster 2010; Best et al. 2011),
plaintiffs with more organizational resources-those organized into class actions or
represented by the government or a public interest law firm-were more likely to
prevail. Plaintiffs also fared well in opinions resulting from a motion to dismiss. We
also found a positive effect for female plaintiffs, but a larger negative interaction
effect for nonwhite female plaintiffs, indicating that all else equal, white women
were more likely to prevail than white men, but nonwhite women fared worse than
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TABLE 2.
Logistic Regressions of Plaintiff Victory on Structures and Judicial Politicsa





















Court, history, and procedural posture
-1.10"** -1.11"** -1.16"** -1.18"***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24)
-1.19*** -1.19*** -1.21*** -0.75*
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.35)
4.23*** 4.24*** 4.17*** 3.39***





0.34 0.58** 0.58** 0.59** 0.45
(0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.32)
0.92** 1.17** 1.15** 1.12** 0.96
(0.31) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.79)
-0.22 0.0051 0.029 0.018 -0.40
(0.33) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.57)
-0.24 -0.066 -0.075 -0.087 -0.56
(0.30) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.52)
-0.52 -0.97* -0.96* -0.98* -0.69
(0.32) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.57)
0.0023 0.0029 0.0026 0.0030 -0.0053
(0.0055) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.010)
-0.29 -0.65** -0.62** -0.60** -0.77*
(0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.37)
1.06** 1.39*** 1.41*** 1.32** 0.047
(0.34) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (1.68)
0.72** 0.53 0.53 0.51 1.17
(0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.86)
-0.29 -0.21 -0.22 -0.19 -0.72
(0.20) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.40)
Circuit; employer won in district -0.97*** -1.49*** -1.49*** -1.49*** -1.68***
(0.18) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.36)
Circuit; employee won in district 0.99** 0.36 0.37 0.38





1.06** 1.05"* 1.06** 1.08**
(0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
-0.0038 0.24 0.25 0.26
(0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
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Table 2. Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)C
Legal theories and claims
Disparate impact -0.18 -0.30 -0.29 -0.27 0.077
(0.25) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.54)
Disparate treatment -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17
(0.22) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Hostile work environment 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.37
(0.21) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.38)
Intersectional claim -0.32 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21 -0.12
(0.20) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.33)
Year -0.014 -0.023 -0.021 -0.022 -0.060*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025)
Constant 27.5 45.1 42.5 42.7 120*
(23.5) (27.8) (27.9) (28.0) (50.5)
Incremental chi2 test b  319*** 2.47 4.58*
Degrees of freedom 3 1 1
Pseudo-R2  0.119 0.356 0.357 0.361 .297
Observations 989 989 989 989 450
'The dependent variable is equal to 1 when the plaintiff achieved at least a partial victory.
bThe incremental chi2 tests compare each model to that in the previous column. These results are
only shown for nested models.
cModel 5 limits the sample to adjudications of employers' motions for summary judgment in dis-
parate treatment cases.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests).
Standard errors are in parentheses.
nonwhite men. These race and gender effects, explored in detail in Best et al.
(2011), only become statistically significant with the inclusion of additional varia-
bles in Models 2 through 4. None of the legal theories or claims was significantly
associated with plaintiff victory. Plaintiff win rates have declined over the years,
but this time pattern was statistically significant only in Model 5, which limits the
sample to adjudications of employers' motions for summary judgment in cases
involving disparate treatment.
Model 2 (Table 2) shows that judicial deference is strongly associated with
employer victory. This model includes counts of the number of structures judges
deferred to, along with controls for the number of structures judges scrutinized and
deemed either adequate or inadequate. Including these measures of judicial reason-
ing substantially improves the fit of the models. Unsurprisingly, when judges scruti-
nize the efficacy of structures and find them adequate, employers are more likely to
prevail, and when structures are found inadequate, plaintiffs are more likely to
secure at least a partial victory. However, employers are also at an advantage when
judges defer to structures-that is, when judges deem structures relevant to the
question of whether discrimination occurred but fail to scrutinize their effectiveness.
Strikingly, it is almost as harmful for plaintiffs when judges defer to a structure as
when they conclude that a structure is adequate. Further, judges defer to almost
twice as many structures as they scrutinize and find adequate, suggesting that, in
practice, deference has a much larger effect on case outcome than does scrutiny.
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FIGURE 1.
Percent of Opinions Involving Judicial Deferencea Over Time
aCases are coded as involving judicial deference when, for at least one structure
deemed relevant to the question of whether discrimination has occurred, the
court (1) never considers adequacy, (2) pays lip service to adequacy, or (3) states
that inadequacy does not matter. The graph shows seven-year moving averages.
These results are especially troubling because judges have become increasingly
likely to defer to organizational structures over time (Edelman et al. 2011). Figure 1
shows the increase over time in the proportion of cases that involve judicial defer-
ence to at least one structure. In the district courts, deference occurred in 20 per-
cent to 30 percent of opinions in the 1970s and 1980s and in over 35 percent by
1999. The increase in deference was more dramatic in the circuit courts, where we
observed no deference before 1980 and then an increase to almost 30 percent of
cases by the mid-1990s (see Figure 1).11
Model 3 (Table 2) adds a measure of judicial conservatism. All else equal,
more conservative judges are less likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs, although this
pattern is not statistically significant. Given that our data come predominantly
from the district courts where judicial ideology has been found to matter less than
in higher courts, the lack of significance is not surprising (Pinello 1999).
Nonetheless, if judicial deference only appeared to be related to case outcome
because conservative judges were looking for an excuse to rule against employees,
the inclusion of this variable should diminish the deference coefficient. Instead, the
inclusion of this measure of judicial ideology has no effect on the deference coeffi-
cient. This pattern indicates that the deference effect is not merely masking the
effects of judicial politics. The deference coefficient is also robust to the inclusion
of judge fixed effects (see Appendix 1). That is, even when comparing opinions
written by the same judge, plaintiffs are less likely to prevail in decisions involving
deference. Thus, neither judicial politics nor any other stable characteristic of
judges can explain away the relationship between deference and case outcome.
11. Both deference and employer victory have become more frequent over the years, making it espe-
cially important to control for the passage of time to ensure that the correlation is not spurious. The models
presented in Table 2 include only a linear year variable, but the results are robust to the inclusion of year
fixed effects (see Appendix 1).
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FIGURE 2.
Predicted Case Outcome by Judicial Politics and Deferencea
apredicted probabilities of at least partial plaintiff victory from Model 4 (Table
Al), with controls held constant at their means. Probabilities were calculated for
judges with common space scores of -. 5 (liberal) and .5 (conservative). The
empirically observed common space scores in our sample ranged from -. 63 to
.66.
Interestingly, however, judicial politics and judicial deference are related in a
more subtle way to case outcome. Model 4 (Table 2) includes an interaction effect
for judicial conservatism and judicial deference. The interaction coefficient meas-
ures whether deference operates similarly for liberal and conservative judges. While
the main effects of deference and conservatism are negative, the interaction effect
is significant and positive, suggesting that deference has a smaller effect for conserv-
ative judges than for liberal judges. To illustrate this pattern, Figure 2 shows the
predicted probabilities of plaintiff victory when liberal and conservative judges defer
to varying numbers of structures. On average, plaintiffs fare better in opinions writ-
ten by liberal judges. However, as judges defer to more structures, this advantage
disappears. Although liberal judges generally favor plaintiffs more than do conserva-
tive judges, liberal judges who defer to organizational structures look more like con-
servative judges.
Finally, we explore whether deference and case outcome are still related in sit-
uations when judges are extremely unlikely to defer to structures purposefully or
strategically to justify a predetermined outcome. Model 5 (Table 2) limits the sam-
ple to opinions resulting from an employer's motion for summary judgment in cases
involving disparate treatment.1 2 When ruling on an employer's motion for summary
judgment, judges are legally prohibited from drawing inferences against the
employee (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 1986; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products
2000). In disparate treatment cases, deference to organizational structures requires
12. By necessity, Model 5 omits variables that no longer vary within the limited sample: disparate
treatment, summary judgment, circuit court cases in which the employee won in the district court, and
motion to dismiss. Cases involving disparate treatment can also involve other legal theories; therefore, the
variables indicating disparate impact and hostile work environment are still included in Model 5.
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the drawing of inferences in favor of the employer. If judicial deference were pri-
marily a conscious attempt to justify a decision that had already been reached, we
would not expect it to occur in these opinions, or to be related to their outcome.
However, limiting the sample to these opinions does not change the size or signifi-
cance of the deference coefficient, which suggests that judicial deference is not pri-
marily a matter of conscious strategy by judges.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Earlier research on law and organizations showed that in the decades following
the passage of EEO laws, employers developed a series of structures that came to be
associated with rationality and legal compliance (Edelman 1992; Sutton et al. 1994;
Sutton and Dobbin 1996; Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Edelman and Petterson 1999;
Edelman, Uggen, and Erlander 1999). Although some structures, such as affirmative
action plans that utilize goals and timetables for minority inclusion, are effective in
reducing inequality (Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006), many are merely symbolic,
doing little or nothing to prevent or ameliorate discrimination in the workplace
(Baron, Mitmann, and Newman 1991; Edelman 1992; Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande
1993; Edelman and Petterson 1999; Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006). Therefore, when
employers introduce structures as evidence of nondiscrimination, judges should con-
sider whether the particular structures are adequate, even-handedly applied, and effec-
tive in preventing discrimination. Yet Edelman et al. (2011) showed that, over time,
judges have become more likely to defer to organizational structures, that is, to use
them to infer nondiscrimination without scrutinizing their adequacy.
The current study shows that judicial deference matters for case outcome, over
and above the effect of judicial ideology. When judges do consider the adequacy of
organizational structures, the result is what might be predicted: if judges find the
structures adequate, the employer usually wins. Conversely, if judges find the struc-
tures inadequate, plaintiffs are more likely to win. Our results show that when
judges defer to organizational structures-treating their mere presence as evidence
of nondiscrimination while failing to scrutinize their effectiveness-employers
benefit.
Troublingly, organizations can win cases when they have antidiscrimination
policies that exist on the books but are not followed in practice, when they have
diversity training programs that do not result in greater diversity or better treatment
of minorities and women, when they have grievance procedures that employees are
afraid to use, and when they have formalized personnel policies that are used post
hoc to justify discriminatory decisions. These findings are especially concerning
when viewed in light of the fact that judicial deference is increasing over time
(Edelman et al. 2011) and was occurring in fully a third of all EEO opinions by the
end of the twentieth century. The rise of judicial deference helps explain why it is
becoming easier for employers to prevail in civil rights cases.
In addition to demonstrating the impact of judicial deference on case outcome,
we document an interaction between judicial conservatism and deference that sug-
gests a new way of thinking about the role of judicial ideology. Whereas much
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work in political science has shown that ideology predicts case outcome (Segal and
Cover 1989; Baum 1992; Segal and Spaeth 1993, 1996, 2002; Spaeth and Segal
1999), our results show that, counterintuitively, liberal judges who defer to institu-
tionalized organizational structures decide cases more like conservative judges. Our
results support the possibility that liberal judges may be more impressed by the
trappings of due process than are conservative judges (Edelman et al. 2011) and
that this pattern of legal reasoning can overshadow their pro-plaintiff inclinations.
Thus, the effects of judicial politics are subtler than a simple bias in either
direction.
Because our data come from written opinions, we cannot directly observe
judges' reasoning processes. We therefore cannot determine whether deferring to
structures caused judges to rule in favor of defendants or whether, having decided
to rule for the defendant, judges invoke the presence of structures to legitimize a
decision made on other grounds. However, two patterns in our data suggest that the
strategic use of structures to justify decisions cannot fully explain the relationship
between deference and case outcome. First, the deference effect remains large and
statistically significant even when controlling for judicial conservatism, suggesting
that the effect of deference is not merely an artifact of conservative judges using
the presence of structures to justify predetermined decisions against plaintiffs. In
fact, the effects of deference are strongest for liberal judges, who tend to view plain-
tiffs more favorably.
Second, as we showed in Model 5 (Table 2), judicial deference is associated
with employer victory even when we limit the sample to opinions resulting from
employers' motions for summary adjudications in disparate treatment cases, in
which adjudications judges are not permitted to draw inferences in favor of the
moving party employer. This finding indicates that, whether mindfully or not, if a
judge uses the presence of a formal structure as evidence of nondiscrimination with-
out scrutinizing its ability to eliminate discrimination, that judge is necessarily using
the structure inferentially, along following syllogistic lines:
P(M) Employers who utilize formal employment structures are rational and fair
and would not discriminate;
P(m) This employer utilizes formal employment structures;
C Therefore, this employer is rational and fair and would not discriminate.
At least since the 1970s, courts have presumed that nondiscrimination is the
norm in the business world and, conversely, that discrimination is aberrant (Krieger
1995, 1998; Krieger and Fiske 2006). In this view, discrimination occurs only when
employers or their agents do something that is wrong, unprofessional, and irrational.
This presumption is illustrated throughout antidiscrimination case law. One can
observe it as early as 1978, in the Supreme Court's decision in Furnco Construction
Company v. Waters where the Court opined:
[We know from our experience that more often than not people do not
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, espe-
cially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting
an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's
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actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume
acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consid-
eration such as race. (1978, 577)
The implicit assumption that discrimination is aberrant and occurs only when
an employer is not acting rationally may lead courts to look for signs or symptoms
of employer legitimacy or rationality. If only allegedly irrational employers discrimi-
nate, and if allegedly rational employers adopt institutionalized structures, then evi-
dence of the presence of those structures supports an inference of rationality, which
in turn supports an inference of nondiscrimination.
If we assume that judges-particularly district court judges, who are most vul-
nerable to reversal on appeal-attempt to comply with the legal standards govern-
ing summary judgment, including the prohibition against drawing inferences against
a nonmoving party plaintiff/employee, it follows that when they defer to institution-
alized structures, judges are unaware that they are drawing an inference at all. It
seems unlikely that a judge-especially a district court judge-would deliberately
draw inferences against a nonmoving party, in direct contravention of controlling
Supreme Court authority, to veil a pro-employer decision reached on other grounds.
It makes much more sense to conclude that judicial deference to institutionalized
employment practices operates as some kind of System 1 heuristic that can be over-
ridden only through subsequent deliberate, effortful, motivated mental processing
(Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001, 2002, 2007). In this respect, our results
are consistent with the intuitive override model of judging posited by Guthrie,
Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2007).
Because judicial deference is not limited to conservative judges and favors
employers, even in summary adjudications in disparate treatment cases, we think
that much of the time, judicial deference may result from a type of priming effect
(Gilbert 1989; Gilbert and Malone 1995; Brest and Krieger 2010). As judges, like
other legal and organizational actors, come to view institutionalized employment
structures and practices as reliable signals of organizational rationality, fairness, and
attention to legal norms, the presence of those structures in a case primes concep-
tions of organizational rationality, fairness, and good governance, making an infer-
ence of organizational fairness and rationality (and therefore nondiscrimination)
not only more likely, but also less recognizable as a type of inferential reasoning at
all. In this way, the presence of institutionalized employment practices, functioning
as signals of organizational rationality and fairness, may bias judicial reasoning and
systematically skew spontaneous attributions of employer motivation (Krieger 1998;
Krieger and Fiske 2006).
Significantly, our findings are consistent with experimental results reported by
Kaiser et al. (2013), which demonstrated that the presence of diversity structures in
descriptions of hypothetical organizations caused high-status group members (i.e.,
whites and males) to view those organizations as being procedurally fair environ-
ments for minorities and women, even in the face of facts indicating that minorities
and women had been disadvantaged within them. The presence of these structures,
Kaiser and her collaborators suggest, creates an illusion of fairness in the treatment
of women and minorities, which leads high-status individuals to underperceive
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discrimination against them and to decrease sympathy toward them when they
claim discrimination (Kaiser et al. 2013). Our findings suggest that judges may be
among those high-status individuals for whom the presence of diversity structures
creates an illusion of fairness that reduces plaintiffs' chances of success in EEO liti-
gation, even in the face of substantial evidence indicating that discrimination has
occurred.
Importantly, however, establishing a causal effect between deference and case
outcome is not essential to our argument. Irrespective of the direction of causation,
the association between judicial deference and case outcome supports legal endoge-
neity theory. This association demonstrates that judicial outcomes are influenced by
managerialized conceptions of law that treat institutionalized organizational struc-
tures as indicative, or even constitutive, of compliance. Regardless of the reasoning
process that produces it, moreover, a body of precedential opinions in which judges
defer to structures and employers prevail reinforces employers' beliefs that ineffec-
tive structures will shield them from discrimination. No matter which way the
causal arrow points, the link between judicial deference and employer victory rein-
forces the cycle of ineffective, symbolic responses to discrimination. In this regard,
judicial deference consistently favors the "haves" over the "have-nots" in the
employment context and is thus an important mechanism through which even laws
designed to protect the have-nots exacerbate patterns of social stratification.
The relationship between judicial deference and case outcome also has impor-
tant implications for social policy. Below, we outline separately the implications for
judges, lawyers, and policy makers.
Implications for Judges
Our results build on the findings of other researchers indicating that judges,
like laypeople, are susceptible to various cognitive biases and heuristics that can sys-
tematically bias their judgment (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001, 2007;
Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski 2005; Rachlinski et al. 2009). Judicial deference
can be understood as a problematic form of implicit judicial cognition that is
shaped by institutionalized practices and their taken-for-granted social meanings.
When judges defer, they draw inferences of nondiscrimination from the mere pres-
ence of structures, the adequacy or effectiveness of which they have ignored,
papered over, or dismissed as legally irrelevant.
Judges should consciously guard against using the presence of institutionalized
employment practices to infer discrimination without careful scrutiny of the quality
of those structures. Spontaneous attributions of fairness in response to institutional-
ized organizational structures can be controlled through a deliberative process that
corrects the intuitively biased initial judgment (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich
2007; Rachlinski et al. 2009), but for that correction to occur, judges must be aware
that they need to monitor their judgments for the effects of cognitive biases and
heuristics, and they must have the time, motivation, and information needed to do
so (Rachlinski et al. 2009). Judges need to understand that the mere presence of
institutionalized employment structures and practices may predispose them to view
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an employer as rational, fair, and compliance oriented and that this, in turn, may
cause them to underidentify the effects of discrimination, particularly in its more
subtle forms, on employer decision making. To maximize adjudicative accuracy,
judges must scrutinize the quality of an employer's structures and practices, and this
requires that plaintiffs be given the opportunity to develop and present facts rele-
vant to this inquiry for the court's consideration.
Accordingly, in managing discovery and in adjudicating discovery disputes,
judges must ensure that plaintiffs are afforded ample opportunity to take discovery
and present evidence on the quality and effectiveness of any organizational compli-
ance structures involved in the case. This is particularly important because substan-
tial research has shown that many of the structures to which judges are deferring
are ineffective in advancing nondiscrimination goals (Kalev and Dobbin 2006; Kalev,
Dobbin, and Kelly 2006).
As importantly, judges must be mindful that the heuristic use of institutionalized
employment practices as indicia of nondiscrimination involves inferential reasoning
that favors employers. For this reason, judges should be particularly vigilant about
avoiding unwitting deference to institutionalized employment practices in summary
adjudication contexts or on appeal under a substantial evidence standard of review.
Judges should be made aware, through judicial training and effective advocacy
by plaintiffs' and government attorneys, that institutionalized employment structures
do not in and of themselves prevent discrimination and that the presence of these
structures should not be used heuristically to infer nondiscrimination, particularly in
summary adjudication contexts. Judges should consider the possibility that even the
mere reference to these structures may implicitly prime constructs of employer
rationality, fairness, and compliance orientation and that this priming effect may in
turn bias their judgments about whether discrimination has occurred. Plaintiffs' law-
yers have a large role to play in assuring that the necessary de-biasing occurs.
Implications for Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Although, ultimately, it is judges who either do or do not infer nondiscrimina-
tion from the mere presence of organizational structures, plaintiffs' attorneys may
play a role in this process by succeeding or failing to draw judicial attention to
inadequacies in employers' structures. To counter the judicial tendency to use these
structures inferentially, particularly in procedurally inappropriate contexts, plaintiffs'
lawyers must deploy sufficient discovery and advocacy resources to uncover and
draw judicial attention to inadequacies in employers' structures. Plaintiffs' attorneys
should also emphasize that by inferring fair treatment from organizational structures
without adequate scrutiny, judges are inappropriately drawing inferences in favor of
the moving party in connection with motions for summary judgment, motions for
judgment as a matter of law, appeals of rulings on those motions, and on reviews of
jury verdicts under a substantial evidence standard of review, none of which is per-
missible under applicable federal trial and appellate procedural rules.
Experienced lawyers representing sexual harassment plaintiffs know that to pre-
vail, they must demonstrate that an employer's antiharassment structures, such as
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antiharassment policies, grievance procedures, and training programs, are inadequate
to prevent harassment from occurring or to remedy harassment if it does occur
(Grossman 2000, 2003; Bisom-Rapp 2001). Plaintiffs' lawyers also generally know
that when an employer policy or practice is itself attacked as illegal, as in a dispar-
ate impact case, success turns in part on demonstrating the practice's lack of relat-
edness to the objectives of EEO law or to the employer's stated business-related
goals (Krieger 1995; Jolls 2001). However, many plaintiffs' lawyers are unaware
that, even though the substantive law does not make formal policies and practices
directly relevant in disparate treatment cases, failure to undermine the "halo
effects" (Brest and Krieger 2010) created by institutionalized employment structures
can significantly lessen a disparate treatment plaintiffs chances of success, even at
the summary judgment stage.
To counter these effects, plaintiffs' lawyers must interrupt judges' heuristic use
of structures as markers of employer rationality and fairness and encourage scrutiny
of those structures. This can be accomplished in two related ways. First, plaintiffs'
lawyers must conduct discovery sufficient to determine whether employers' struc-
tures are adequate, either in general or in the context of a particular case, to pre-
vent as opposed to merely mask discrimination (Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006;
Krieger and Fiske 2006). This discovery should illuminate whether, how, and to
what effect the structure was applied in other situations, whether the practice was
designed and operated to control implicit or other subtle forms of bias, and whether
the practice has actually been shown to have any efficacy in advancing EEO goals
(Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006). To the extent that problems are found, these
must be made salient to the court.
Second, in employer-filed motions for summary adjudication, plaintiffs' lawyers
must be prepared to argue effectively against the inferential use of structures in
ways that favor the employer/defendant. In disparate treatment cases, judicial defer-
ence is unquestionably a form of judicial inference. From the presence of formal
employment policies and practices, judges infer employer rationality, fair-
mindedness, and attention to legal norms. From employer rationality, fair-
mindedness, and attentiveness to legal norms, judges infer the employer's disinclina-
tion toward discrimination.
Plaintiffs' lawyers must constantly remind district and circuit court judges that
the drawing of inferences-even rational ones-is a fact-finder function, inappropri-
ate for a judge deciding a summary judgment motion or motion for judgment as a
matter of law (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 1986; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products
2000). In addition, plaintiffs' lawyers must remind appellate court judges who are
reviewing trial court grants of summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law,
or who are reviewing findings of fact after trial under a substantial evidence stand-
ard of review, that the drawing of inferences in ways that favor a moving party or
an appellant who lost at trial (Krieger 1998; Wald 1998; Krieger and Fiske 2006;
Gertner 2012) is prohibited. The heuristic use of institutionalized employment prac-
tices to infer an absence of discriminatory intent, particularly where there has been
no meaningful scrutiny of the practice's adequacy, represents a kind of movant-
favoring inferential reasoning that is prohibited in these procedural contexts.
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Implications for Policy Makers
Finally, our findings have significant implications for policy makers, including
legal scholars who favor new governance approaches, to EEO compliance policy
(Sturm 2001; Green 2003, 2005, 2007; Lobel 2004, 2009, 2012). Our findings
undermine key assumptions underlying those approaches, particularly the assump-
tion that courts are institutionally equipped to distinguish effectively between actual
compliance with EEO norms and the mere presence of cosmetic or symbolic com-
pliance structures (Krawiec 2003).
For law enforcement agencies, such as the EEOC, the Department of Labor's
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, and their state equivalents, our
findings caution against the promulgation of administrative guidance that urges
employers to adopt formal employment policies, practices, or structures without at
the same time using tangible metrics to ensure that these policies, practices, and
structure do not serve as mere symbolic indicia of compliance lacking any actual
effect on advancing equality or preventing discrimination. Similarly, our findings
suggest that the establishment of formal policies, practices, or structures as part of a
conciliation agreement, settlement, or judicial decree may be less efficacious in pre-
venting future incidents of discrimination than is commonly thought.
In particular, administrative agencies like the EEOC should be wary of new
governance approaches to EEO compliance. New governance advocates argue that
the best way to eliminate discrimination is not to police discrimination itself, but
to provide incentives for organizations to design structures and practices, such as
ethical codes of conduct, diversity training programs, and grievance procedures,
that are conducive of general legal norms of workplace equality (Sturm 2001; Lobel
2004; Green 2005). Lobel, for example, suggests that courts encourage employers to
reduce discrimination by developing internal compliance structures, "including self-
adopted equal employment policies, codes, and diversity training programs" (2004,
421). Similarly, Sturm's (2001) structural approach to EEO regulation proposes that
courts articulate legal norms and provide incentives for employers to design and
adopt mechanisms for complying with these norms. Among the mechanisms she
proposes are training programs, internal reporting channels, and other forms of self-
monitoring.
Our findings join a growing chorus of voices questioning the soundness of
these new governance approaches to EEO policy. Opponents of the approach
(Grossman 2003; Krawiec 2003; Bagenstos 2006) and supportive skeptics (Estlund
2011) point out that courts have so far shown themselves to be either disinclined
or ill equipped-or both-to assess the effectiveness of employer-created compli-
ance structures. Our results support these concerns. By 1999, judicial deference to
institutionalized employment practices was occurring in one-third of federal EEO
cases reported on Westlaw. Not only are federal courts apparently unable to distin-
guish meaningful from cosmetic compliance (Krawiec 2003), their lack of inclina-
tion or capacity systematically and significantly skews the outcome of EEO
litigation in employers' favor. These troubling patterns of judicial reasoning demon-
strate yet another way that the haves come out ahead.
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APPENDIX 1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Our results are robust to various model specifications. Table Al presents the
results from four robustness checks, along with the coefficients from Model 4 for
comparison. First, we explore an alternate definition of judicial deference. For the
analyses discussed in the main text, we coded deference as occurring when judges
(1) did not consider adequacy at all, (2) paid lip service to adequacy, or (3) con-
cluded that a structure was inadequate but explicitly stated that inadequacy does
not matter. We defined lip service as occurring when an opinion stated that a
structure was adequate but also included facts that made it self-evident that the
structure was inadequate. We only coded lip service in very extreme examples and
in cases in which two coders agreed that lip service had occurred. However, since
the lip service category is more subjective than the other two forms of deference,
we reran all analyses with lip service excluded from the definition of deference.
Model Al uses a recoded deference variable that includes only structures in which
judges did not consider adequacy or explicitly stated that inadequacy did not mat-
ter. The deference coefficients are almost identical to those in Model 4. One differ-
ence is that the interaction effect between deference and judicial conservatism is
now only significant at the p < .1 level (p = .051). Model Al demonstrates that
the lip service cases are not driving the deference results reported in the main text.
Second, an alternate explanation for our findings could be that certain judges are
more likely to defer to structures and that those same judges are predisposed to favor
employers. The fact that we coded multiple opinions from some judges allows us to
explore this possibility empirically. Our sample includes multiple opinions from 198
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judges (out of a total of 670 judges). (In the circuit court, we classify opinions as by
the same judge when that judge wrote the majority opinion, even though other judges
served on the panel.) We began by adding judge fixed effects to Model 2. (We did not
add them to Model 4 because in the district court, our measure of judicial conserva-
tism only varies between judges.) With the judge fixed effects in the model, the defer-
ence effect becomes slightly larger, moving from -1.10 to -1.17. (Full results from the
fixed effects model are not presented in Table Al, which compares alternate specifica-
tions of Model 4, but are available from the authors upon request.) Thus, even when
comparing opinions written by the same judge, employers are more likely to prevail
when the judge defers to more structures.
Random effects allow us to account for unmeasured characteristics of judges in mod-
els that include measures of judicial conservatism. Model A2 adds judge random effects
to Model 4 with virtually no change in the coefficients. Since the intraclass correlation
is not significantly different from zero, we do not include random effects in the models
presented in the main text. The fact that the inclusion of judge fixed or random effects
does not diminish the deference coefficients indicates that unmeasured characteristics of
judges cannot account for the relationship between deference and case outcome.
Third, since both deference and employer victory rates have increased over the
years, it is especially important to control adequately for changes over time. The mod-
els discussed in the main text include a linear year variable. Model A3 replaces this
variable with year fixed effects to account for any nonlinear time trends. In Model A3,
the coefficients for structure types and judicial politics actually increase slightly as com-
pared to Model 4. Thus, changes over time cannot explain away the deference effect;
even within years, deference and case outcome are significantly related to one another.
Fourth, we chose to simplify the results presented in the main text by collapsing
our dependent variable to two categories. However, our coding scheme included a
more sensitive measure of case outcome. Model A4 presents results from generalized
ordered logistic regressions of a three-category dependent variable (employer victory,
mixed outcome, and plaintiff victory). The results from this model are presented in two
columns, predicting first the odds of at least a partial plaintiff victory (as opposed to a
complete defendant victory) and, second, the odds of a complete plaintiff victory (as
opposed to an at least partial defendant victory). Our key results are similar, with one
exception: the effects of judicial conservatism, and its interaction with deference, are
now only significant at the p < .1 level. However, they remain similar in magnitude.
APPENDIX 2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
TABLE A2.
Organizational Structures and Their Frequencies
Percent of Opinions
Structure Referencing Structure
Compliance Structures: Ways to complain and explicit efforts at preventing discrimination
Formal grievance procedure (written multilevel 15
procedure)
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Table A2. Continued
Structure
EEO/AA office or officer
Simple policy prohibiting illegal activity
HR office with explicit EEO function
Informal open-door policy (not written but exists in
practice)
Employer's offer of accommodations
Employer's willingness to discuss accommodations
Formal open door policy (written statement that boss's
door always open)
No written policy but court says employer generally fol-
lows a process that indicates fairness
Diversity office or officer
Legally required poster
Other explicit efforts at preventing discrimination (e.g.,
AAP)
Other ways to complain
Standardized Personnel Practices/Policies
Evaluation procedure (including rebuttal and complaints;
including quantitative rating systems)
Other standardized personnel practices/policies (must be
ongoing/non-ad-hoc practice)
HR office with NO explicit EEO function
Multiperson decision-making process, formal
Progressive discipline policy (verbal warning, written
warning, fired)
Seniority/tenure policy
Training program (may be external to organization)
Job posting/notice of interest in new job
Written job description
Employee handbook
Multiperson decision-making process, informal
Record-keeping procedure
Leave policy (including rules for giving notice)
Attendance policy
Recruitment program
Policy regarding notice time for leave
Generalized Employer Prerogatives
Define job and allocate tasks (including restructuring)
Restructuring (reduction in force, downsizing involving
job loss)
Subjective evaluation criteria (e.g., leadership skills), use
of
Other employer prerogatives (must be ongoing/not ad-








































Set time, place, and attendance (including restructuring) 2
Inside candidates, preference for 2
Word-of-mouth recruitment, use of 2
Physical requirements (age, weight, height) 2
Appearance requirements 2
Set pay based on competition, availability, labor market 1
Language skills, including good English or no accent, 1
preference for
Set pay based on employer's special needs I
Recent education, preference for I
